could not come to some agreement. Sanctions in the WTO are based upon the amount of harm suffered in the international marketplace by the complaining country. Using that metric, the EU calculates that it could seek 100 percent tariffs on $4 billion of US exports. ' Should this occur, it would be far and away the largest retaliation taken under the new WTO dispute settlement system. It would come on top of two other corrosive quarrels between the two trading partners. In one, the US has levied some $200 million in tariffs on European goods after the EU refused to alter its restrictions on banana imports from Central America; and in the second, the US has levied over $100 million in tariffs on European goods because the EU has banned hormonetreated beef.
Taken together, these snapshots of the current travails of the WTO create a picture of the current state of the organization. The WTO faces enormous new pressures from the outside, with the emergence of powerful anti-globalist sentiment matched by determined new transnational interest groups that are effectively exploiting that sentiment. At the same time, the WTO is saddled with a constitutional structure that may cripple its ability both to deal with its external antagonists and-of greater importance-to settle disputes between member states in
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'Vo. 2 Nfo. 2 free Trae, Soverenty, -Democrac a manner that upholds the rules and at the same time is satisfactory to the contending parties.
The appearance of large numbers of groups that support the UN and explicitly link that support to opposition to the free trade mandate of the WTO validates the assumption that it is no longer possible to analyze the WTO and the international trading system in isolation from other multinational organizations and regimes, particularly the UN and the vastly increased number of international environmental treaties, agreements, and declarations. Virtually unheralded, the ambition and reach of UN leaders and programs have grown mightily since the end of the Cold War. Similarly, over the past three decades, the number of environmental agreementsmany with trade sanctions as the compliance weapon of choice-has multiplied, resulting in a plethora of international rules on matters such as hazardous wastes, the ozone layer, biological diversity, endangered species, wildlife preservation, wetlands, migratory species, marine pollution, transboundary air pollution, tropical timber, and Antarctica. This has already led to clashes between trade and environmental rules, as demonstrated by the WTO Shrimp/turtle and Tuna/dolphin cases.
The aforementioned interview with the head of a non-governmental organization ("NGO") underscores another major phenomenon of the past decade: the emergence across a wide policy landscape of groups of politically and rhetorically powerful "citizen activists" who vigorously lobby governments at all levels (subnational, national, and international) on all manner of issues, from trade and the environment to consumers' rights, human rights, women's rights, childrens rights, and animal rights.' Many, though by no means all, of these "citizen activists" groups directly challenge the predominant capitalist beliefs of wealth creation and hold that other social, environmental, and spiritual values are being sacrificed on the altars of free trade and footloose capital movements.
Though many NGOs are local and small, the environmental and consumer groups that have taken the lead in challenging the WTO and the doctrine of free trade have very large budgets and payrolls and operate in many countries. For instance, Greenpeace operates in 20 countries and has an annual income of almost $100 million; the World Wildlife Fund operates in 28 countries and has an annual income of about $164 million; Friends of the Earth International operates in 50 countries with an income of $320 million. These formidable resources mean that the largest and most powerful NGOs can heavily outmatch the resources that many
6.
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members of the WTO can bring to bear-an important factor when considering demands for more transparency and "public" participation in the dispute settlement (and legislative) systems of the WTO. In their broadest reach, "participatory" theories advanced by some NGOs posit a new "democratic" international order in which NGOs would offer an "alternate form of representation" in competition with governments, while others argue for an International Labor Organization model in which governments, corporations, and NGOs work in partnership to create new rules for an emerging international order. In the short term, the focus is on access and more direct participation in both the dispute settlement and the rule-making activities of the WTO. It can be readily conceded that, in the past, corporate interests have predominated in the corridors of the WTO (not through any conspiracy, but largely because few, outside of exporters and importers, really cared about the level of tariffs on the borders). The solution to this problem, however, is not to allow NGOs and corporations into the negotiations and the dispute settlement process, but to place them both firmly on an equal footing outside the door of the negotiating room and judicial chamber. WTO dispute settlement procedures should be reformed to allow greater transparency and the introduction of more varied viewpoints into the process-for instance, through broadening the professional backgrounds of members of WTO dispute panels.
The WTO as "World Court"-The WTO is overextended and in danger of losing authority and legitimacy as the arbiter of trade disputes among the world's major trading nations. In explaining how this came about, the clich6d aphorism, "Be careful what you wish for" is apt. The situation faced today by the WTO flows directly from the great success of the Uruguay Round, which hugely extended the substantive mandate of the international trade regime. Rules for service industries-banks, insurance companies, telecommunications and internet regulation, energy services, transportation, et cetera-meant that the trade regime now would be asked to deal with complex issues that go deep into the economic and social structures of its member states (and with the telecommunications annex, the WTO actually has negotiated a competition policy agreement). Added to this was a wholly new regime for intellectual property ("IP"), introduced at a time of great ferment within individual nations over the challenges to IP brought about by new technologies such as software and biotechnology.
The point is that many of these new substantive obligations cannot be solved by simple protectionist versus non-protectionist answers, as was the case with tariffs. As Sylvia Ostry has written of the new system: "The degree of intrusiveness into domestic sovereignty bears little resemblance to the shallow integration of the GATT with its focus on border barriers .... The WTO had shifted from the GATT model Yet the Uruguay Round negotiators placed on top of these extremely difficult new substantive challenges a much more rigid, judicialized dispute settlement system that promised legal certainty and finality in each case. Also, under the new system, a ruling by a WTO panel or the Appellate Body ("AB") will stand unless there is a consensus among WTO members (acting as members of the new Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB")) against the decision.
In a recent essay, Professor J.H.H. Weiler of the Harvard Law School has contrasted the "diplomatic ethos" of the old General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")-where "empanelment was, indeed, a continuation of diplomacy by other means," where "confidentiality" was highly prized, and where disputes were handled by "trade diplomats"-with the quite different paradigm of the "Rule of Lawyers and the Culture of Law" adopted under the new WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU") in 1995. 9 Arguing that "much of the legal culture is at odds with the ethos of diplomacy," he lists crucial differences, including." o In contrast to GATT "diplomatic" solutions that aimed for accommodation among disputants, "Legal disputes [in the VTO] which go to adjudication are not settled; they are won and lost. The headlines speak of 'victory and 'defeat."' * Though the rule of law is supposed to be dispassionate and objective, it is not so when two parties both believe the law is on their side and litigate: "Then it becomes a profession of passion, of rhetoric, of a desire to win ... all inimical to compromise .... There are to my knowledge less than a handful of cases in the history of the WTO where a compromise was found and a dispute settled once a Panel started its work. " u o Likewise, though the legal professionals directing the process should act in an objective manner regarding the merits of a case, in reality, they are (like other professionals) "people with ambition, with a search for job satisfaction: Weiler favors the new "rule of law" in the WVTO, and the thesis of his essay is that m order for the new legal paradigm to attain legitimacy, vestiges of the old diplomatic paradigm should be expunged from the dispute settlement rules and procedures. Though his conclusions are at odds vith tho:s of this article, his description of the two paradigms is dead on. 10.
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Thus: "A huge factor in the decision whether to go for legal resolution will have been the conscious and often subconscious input by lawyers driven by ambition and their particular professional deformations. The 'we can win in court ...' becomes in the hands of all too many lawyers an almost automatic trigger to 'we should bring the case.""' Though the WTO members did not understand the constitutional implications of the creation of the AB, the new DSU in effect made it a "high court" and gave it the final word in interpreting the WTO agreements: "De jure the DSU leaves the final interpretation of the Agreements in the hands of the General Council and Ministerial Conference. De facto, unless the Organization is to break the hallowed principle of consensus, that power has shifted to the Appellate Body."" In turn, what the AB has told the panels is that their main goal should no longer be compromise and getting agreement from both parties. Rather, "It is 'getting it (legally) right,' and/or 'making it appeal-proof. In its present form the new judicialized" WTO dispute settlement system is substantively and politically unsustainable. Substantively, there is no real consensus among WTO members on many of the complex regulatory issues that the panels and the AB will be asked to rule upon, and in many instances the underlying treaty text contains gaps, ambiguities, and contradictory language. Politically, the imbalance between the ineffective rulemaking procedures and the highly efficient judicial mechanisms will increasingly pressure the panels and the AB to "create" law, raising intractable questions of democratic legitimacy. In response to these flaws, alternatives should be pursued that will reintroduce some of the former elements of "diplomatic" flexibility that characterized the earlier GATT regime. 6 Conciliation, mediation, and voluntary arbitration need to be added as real substitutes, and decisions that are clearly opposed by a substantial minority of WTO members should be set aside by a 13.
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Two close observers of international organizations, and the WTO in particular, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, have recently warned that because they lack strong political ties to domestic political processes and constituencies, "the legitimacy of global institutions will probably remain shaky for many decades." For this reason, they also state: "Putting too much weight on international institutions before they are sufficiently legitimate to bear that responsibility, is a recipe for deadlock, disruptions and failure: Though the two political scientists may not agree with the specific proposals in this article and in the larger affiliated study, they are being advanced with their blocking mechanism until further negotiations can produce a consensus. In addition, the current welfare-reducing systems of sanctions should be replaced with provisions for compensation, either through fines or trade-liberalization measures to offset the economic effect of rules violations. Sovereignty-In a March 2000 speech, John Jackson of Georgetown University, one of the two deans of GATT/WTO legal scholarship in the United States (the other being Robert Hudec, now at Tufts University), warned scholars of the international trading system against falling back on a series of "mantras," which in Jackson's opinion are phrases that "are used to avoid thinking certain issues through." 7 Two of the phrases he lists are "sovereignty" and "government to government" (when describing the workings of the WTO).
It is indeed important to think through both phrases as they relate to the future of the WTO and US participation in that institution. As political scientist Stephen Krasner has conceptualized it, sovereignty has many dimensions, two of which are central to the issues dealt with in this article: Westphalian sovereignty, which refers to the exclusion of foreign actors from domestic decisionmaking; and interdependence, which refers to a nation's control over the cross-border movement of goods, services, capital, labor, and information." Responding to those who argue that the sovereignty of the nation state was once internally and externally "exclusive and absolute," but now has been eroded by transportation and communications advances, globalism in general, and the rise of NGOs, Krasner shows that sovereignty was never absolute and was always "frail as a legal principle." Thus the contemporary trends are part of the warp and woof of historical cycles. 9 One does not have to adopt Krasner's ultimately "realist" thesis (that legal sovereignty was always "organized hypocrisy" that disguised more fundamental divisions of power, and that nations ignored it at will in the pursuit of national interests) to adopt his historical judgment that sovereignty in its Westphalian form has always consisted of balancing judgments regarding the distribution of power between the nation state and international alliances and organizations.
Jackson similarly argues for thinking about sovereignty "as a decision about how to allocate power ... (and) about how to correctly design that allocation." a Agreedand it should be stated up front that the conclusions in this article proceed from the belief that even with the revolution in communications and transportation technologies, even with globalization and the rise of vociferous NGOs who clamor for Krasner, Soveriegnty at 9-25 (cited in note 18). 20.
Jackson, 4J Intl Econ L at 72 (cited in note 17).
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recognition and shared power, fundamental democratic legitimacy still is a monopoly of constitutionally constructed democratic states. In Why Sovereignty Matters, a book published by the American Enterprise Institute several years ago, Jeremy Rabkin argued that, as then constituted, "the trading system is quite compatible with traditional notions of sovereignty." 2 He noted, for instance, that it focused only on goods and services that cross international borders and not on how they were produced inside the borders; that it operated with ad hoc panels which did not build "ambitious 'case law" that would go beyond negotiated rules; that neither firms nor individuals had direct recourse to the dispute settlement system; and that, unlike the North American Free Trade Agreement, there were no linkages to broader non-trade issues such as labor and the environment.' Pressures are growing that would reverse most of the virtuous characteristics that Rabkin cited.
In addition, Rabkin to some degree misdiagnosed a potential ill. He worried about the new amending procedures for new rules. While admitting that the hurdles for such amendments were quite high, he expressed some concern that the United States might be outvoted and that the WTO could move in directions more intrusive to the US constitutional system. 23 What he did not foresee was a very different problem: the great inefficiency of the WTO rulemaking (legislative) procedures has greatly increased pressure on the dispute settlement system (the judicial branch) to create new rules or reinterpret old rules through the back door. Further, WTO panels and the AB are already being pressed to include "soft" and customary law as precedents for their decisions-a practice Rabkin strongly condemned in his book.
There are two final points. The recommendations made at the end of this article admittedly cannot be put into place in the current climate of deep division within the WTO and given the high hurdles that face any attempt to create new rules or amend old rules under the current system. Change on the order recommended here will be possible only as a part of an overall negotiating package in a future trade round, and it will only come about after a significant number of WTO members-both from developing and developed countries-perceive that, while the new WTO is and should remain an important force for more open markets and enhanced competition among countries, its present constitution is actually an obstacle to those goals.
Finally, it should be noted that these recommendations come in the midst of major reevaluations of the Bretton Woods institutions established at the end of the Second World War. Last year, the Meltzer Commission issued a scathing report on the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, arguing that they had greatly exceeded their original mandates, were overextended and could not deliver on the 21.
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.Free Trad, Soverenty, 'Detnocrac goals they set for themselves. 2 The WTO is in somewhat better shape; the Uruguay Round represented an important first step toward reform and reshaping the institution to meet new challenges over the coming decades. John Jackson has noted the "folly' of the desire of "some people in the United States [to] reverse course and take the WTO back to the time when it was only responsible for border measures." ' While I do not agree with "some people" I would argue: (1) that in order to deal with the complex new issues presented by national regulations inside the border, the WTO will have to adopt a less rigid, more flexible dispute settlement system, one that does not promise a "correct" legal answer to every problem; and (2) that the best means of achieving continued democratic legitimacy is for the WTO to remain a "government-to-government organization, one in which governments take decisions in the VITO after having sorted through and resolved conflicting claims and the demands of competing interests in the domestic political process.
II. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 1. Forced Conciliation, Mediation and Voluntary Arbitration.
The goal of the first and second recommendations is to partially move the WTO dispute settlement system back in the direction of the original "diplomatic" model for dispute settlement, and away from the judicial model introduced by the new DSU of the Uruguay Round. With that aim in mind, the first recommendation is that the Director General or a special standing committee of the DSB be empowered to step in and direct that the contending WTO member states settle their differences through bilateral negotiations, through mediation or by agreeing to arbitration by an outside party. The criteria for such action would include situations where the highly divisive political nature of the contest would cause permanent damage to the WTO or where, in thejudgment of the Director General (or of a DSB Committee), there is no established legislative rule or where the existing language papered over deep substantive divisions among WTO members.
Repairing a Constitutional Flaw: A Blocking Minority.
The goal of the second recommendation is to redress the imbalance between the highly efficient dispute settlement system and the ineffective, consensus-plagued 
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T4.Crf rulemaking procedures. This will be accomplished through a doubly calculated minority blocking mechanism; thus, at any time at least one-third of the members of the DSB, amounting to at least one-quarter of total trade among WTO members, register opposition to a panel or AB decision, that decision shall be set asideblocked-and the DSB should affirm that it is not binding WTO law. Subsequently, the normal legislative process of the WTO should be invoked through action by the General Council either to amend existing rules or to establish new rules. If the General Council cannot reach consensus and agreement, then the issue will be left to be settled at the next major round of WTO trade negotiations, as part of a larger package of compromises. It is expected that, even with the establishment of these "diplomatic" escape clauses (mediation, blocking minority), a vast majority of disputes would still be handled through the DSU negotiated during the Uruguay Round. Under this proposal, the existing option of compensation would become the sole remedy for non-compliance with a panel or AB ruling. Two alternative methods of compensation should be considered as options. First, compensation could be exacted through a monetary fine on the offending nation, with the sum of the fine calculated by a neutral third party or subcommittee of the DSB. Second, the offending WTO member could agree to institute trade liberalization equivalent in commercial value to the cost of the trade barrier(s) to the complaining country. Again, the commercial cost of the trade barrier would be determined by a neutral third party.
Direct Effect.
Under the doctrine of direct effect, a nation agrees that its domestic laws will be bound by rules negotiated under a treaty. Direct effect gives a private citizen the power to demand relief from, or bring a claim against, another private citizen or the state itself pursuant to the terms of an international agreement. Clearly, adherence to the direct effect doctrine alters the relationship between the state, private actors, and domestic courts. The recommendation is that the US Congress, as it has in four recent trade agreements, continue to explicitly deny both direct effect and the selfexecution of a treaty. As recent multilateral, regional and bilateral trade agreements have produced rules that attempt to regulate areas central to domestic governanceservices, intellectual property, investment-it is imperative that national legislatures, including the US Congress, exert greater vigilance in retaining the final determination over the content of these core elements of domestic regulation. The WTO should establish rules that provide for the publication of all government documents submitted pursuant to a panel or AB proceeding at the time they are presented. Such documents should be posted on the Internet. Information that is confidential for businesses would continue to be protected.
6. Public Access to Dispute Settlement Proceedings. If, as recommended here, all government documents are published when presented, it would also make sense to provide for public access to the opening sessions of both the panels and the AB. This would allow interested parties and the public to observe opening arguments of all participants, including third parties. This would protect the process from undue pressure while later questions and colloquy proceed and, at the same time, would allow for widespread dissemination of the basic, underlying issues.
7. Amicus Briefs.
The DSB should exert strong pressure on the AB to review and withdraw its decision to allow acceptance of amicus briefs by itself and the panels. As noted in the text, Australia has taken the lead in urging WTO members to begin drafting rules on amicus briefs that will ensure the safeguarding of members' equity, transparency and due process and impose "necessary disciplines" on acceptance of such briefs. As the representatives of developing countries have argued, the issue goes beyond questions of process and raises questions of equity in that smaller countries could be continually outgunned by the vast legal resources of multinational corporations and NGOs. In the future, the WTO may well decide to allow outside documents to be included in dispute settlement proceedings; but this decision, and the conditions surrounding the introduction of such documents, should be negotiated by WTO members, and not introduced through the back door by the AB.
C. PARTICIPATION 8. Expand Diversity of Panels. The language of the DSU clearly foresees that, in addition to trade experts, nontrade specialists should be recruited for cases that involve issues beyond commercial rules. Taking advantage of this flexibility, the WTO should move quickly to assemble expert panelists from such allied fields as the environment, food safety, genetics, and the intricacies of intellectual property. The net should be cast widely, with scientists 
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and social scientists added to the usual list of lawyers, legal scholars, and retired diplomats.
9. Public Hearing During Conciliation, Mediation Proceedings.
Should the proposal advanced above for a less judicialized mediation and conciliation mechanism be accepted, a corollary recommendation would be for the Director General to be given the authority by the parties to convene a public hearing at which a moderator would take testimony from experts and then suggest a solution acceptable to all parties. Even if the moderator failed to satisfy the parties, the process would benefit by the expert testimony and a public exploration of the issues.
Formal Consultation.
Building on the experience of the WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment, the WTO should institute a systematic method of consultation with interested outside groups and experts, including NGOs, scientific and professional societies, and corporate associations. The WTO Secretariat should be encouraged and empowered to convene a continuous series of seminars, symposia, and larger conferences to inform WTO members and staff of the technical issues raised by WTO rules and by disputes among members. As a means of increasing the democratic accountability and legitimacy of the WTO, national legislatures should become much more involved in, or at least aware of, the construction of rules and regulations passed by international organizations. The recommendation is that as a first step, the US Congress should establish a bipartisan commission that would be assigned two tasks: (1) to report on the implications of the WTO dispute settlement system on the US constitutional system and on US domestic laws and regulations; and (2) to report on the cumulative impact of rulings, pronouncements, and resolutions that have emerged from major UN organizations such as the Economic and Social Council, the International Labor Organization, the World Health Organization, and the Food and Agricultural Organization (thus, including the environment, human rights, health policy, social development, population policy, and children's and women's rights). The goal of the commission would be to provide the Congress with a greater understanding of the full implications of the growing number of international policy pronouncements on US domestic policy.
Vol. z No. Z [Tree Trade, Sovereiqnty, 'DIemocracy Congress should also consider establishing a permanent joint committee to provide continuing oversight and analysis of rules passed by international bodies that have an impact on US domestic laws and regulations.
E. EMINENT PERSONS GROUP 12. Eminent Persons Group.
The WTO should establish an Eminent Persons Group (as it did with commendable results during the 1980s) to examine the systemic problems and issues surrounding WTO governance and the relationship between the WTO and other international regimes, particularly the future relationship with the Multilateral Environmental Agreements. Regarding WTO governance, two issues would lead the agenda: (1) how to reform the executive functioning of the WTO in a manner that accommodates the complaints of exclusion by developing countries, while at the same time streamlines the process of decision-making; and (2) how to reform the legislative andjudicial functions so that a more viable balance can be achieved, in order to relieve pressure on the dispute settlement system to create law and change the rights and obligations of WTO members.
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